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Space Command and Control

Managing the Integration of Space
and Information Operations
We should not go to space unless itʼs the only way we can do a
job, or can do it better, or itʼs cheaper. The global movement of
information seems to be the one thing we can use space for that
we have not learned how to do on earth.1
- Lt Gen Richard Henry, 1982

B

ecause over twenty years has passed since the establishment of Space Command in 1982, most members of the
military are now comfortable with the axiom that space is the
fourth realm of warfare in addition to the traditional spheres of
land, air, and sea. However, this transition was slow in coming.
Even though the Cold War had seen operations brewing in space
since the late 1950s, it took the establishment of a separate uniﬁed military command, the United States Space Command, or
USSPACECOM (and, in 2001, a scathing Congressional report
threatening to establish a separate space service), as well as years
of joint space operations and wrangling over the creation of space
doctrine, before space was accepted as a separate and distinct
sphere of combat.
It is ironic, then, that a ﬁfth dimension of conﬂict, the realm of
information operations (IO), has been less universally accepted
as a theater of offensive and defensive warfare, despite the fact
that armed forces have sought, defended, attacked, and exploited
information in battle for centuries. Information warfare is unfortunately tied to modern technology and computers, forgetting
that the concept can be as simple as a wooden horse left as a gift
outside a great fortiﬁed city.
However, military tacticians now understand and appreciate
that the concept of information operations has been gradually getting more attention focused on it in doctrine and contemporary
military operations. Inevitably in the 21st century the technological aspect of conducting information operations is going to be
linked to two things: space and cyberspace. In this article, we will
concentrate on the former, with the understanding that computers
and the associated links, networks and nodes play a vital role in
the command and control of operations in space. We will discuss
the historical ties between space and information operations, the
difﬁculty that we in the space community have had in grasping
information operations as a viable separate construct, and we will
review some of the Air Forceʼs education efforts being applied
to change that paradigm. Finally, we will propose solutions to
ensure information operations continue to be an effective weapon
in our militaryʼs arsenal.
History

Weʼve spent thirty-ﬁve or forty billion dollars on the space program.
And if nothing else had come out of it except the knowledge weʼve
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gained from space photography it would be worth ten times what
the whole program cost. Because tonight we know how many missiles the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were way off. We
were doing things we didnʼt need to do. We were building things
we didnʼt need to build. We were harboring fears we didnʼt need to
- President Lyndon Johnson, 1967
harbor.2

Similar to the ﬁrst military uses of airplanes and balloons, the
initial utility of satellites came from its surveillance capabilities.
Space was the ultimate “high ground”—as every general from
Patton to Napoleon to Caesar would tell you, knowing what is
happening on the other side of that hill is paramount for situation awareness. The National Reconnaissance Ofﬁceʼs recently
declassiﬁed CORONA program was established in 1960 as the
nationʼs ﬁrst operational satellite photo reconnaissance project.
Imagery intelligence is still a vital asset provided by optical satellite sensors today, though it is telling to see how far the technology has advanced in forty years.

Figure 1. NRO Figure 2. GeoEye

Maj Daniel F. Gottrich, USAF
Michael R. Grimaila, PhD, AFIT

Figure 1. (left) First imagery taken by CORONA, Mys Shmidta Air
Field, USSR, 1960. Figure 2. (right) Nellis AFB, Nevada, 2002.

Ever since the 1957 launch of Sputnik, when the United States
realized that the Soviet Union could now launch a rocket capable
of landing an object (a nuclear warhead?) anywhere on the globe,
our military posture became based on information gathering and
deterrence based on ﬂexible response. As Lt Col James Lee
wrote in Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance,
“US military space systems were initially developed in a Cold
War context and viewed as primarily strategic systems—supporting the Strategic Air Command, the intelligence community, and
the National Command Authorities. Timely, accurate, and unambiguous strategic and tactical warning information from reconnaissance, surveillance, and communication satellites provided
situation awareness of our perceived enemy and became integral
to the deterrent power of the triad.”3
In essence, Lee asserts that our military systems became almost
a hidden fourth leg of the strategic nuclear triad. The strength
of Soviet and American nuclear deterrence relied on the ability
of satellites and their ground networks to collect, process, and
disseminate information. The balance of information provided
by these systems resulted in each of the belligerents having a
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sufﬁcient amount of timely warning of the other sideʼs capabilities
and actions. Lee continues, “Maintaining the balance in warning
information prevented one side from achieving surprise and
rendering the other side incapable of a nuclear retaliatory strike.
In fact, the value of the information from space systems was
viewed as essential for cold war stability, and many argued that
space must remain a sanctuary to preserve stability.”4
Ultimately, spaceʼs role in “standing toe to toe with the Ruskies”
has been played out, with, some argue, President Reaganʼs threats
to provide an anti-nuclear blanket of protection with his Strategic Defense Initiative bankrupting the Soviet coffers when they
attempted to counter it. Space has more recently moved from
this strategic role to the tactical missions of day-to-day combat
support.
Operation DESERT STORM is mistakenly referred to as the
“ﬁrst space war,” though no battles were fought from or through
space. But the Gulf War saw the ﬁrst combat use of Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, used both by supporting General
Norman Schwarzkopfʼs “left hook” through the featureless desert and through Joint Direct Attack Munitions, or “smart bombs.”
This war also highlighted the multiple uses of satellites in providing imagery, weather data, theater ballistic missile launch warning, and, especially, communications in remote areas with not a
lot of land lines. More than 90 percent of communications intheater was provided via the Defense Satellite Communications
System, an array of satellites orbiting 28,000 miles overhead.
The conﬂict also pointed out our asymmetric advantage in the
space arena, however, and some of the beneﬁts we enjoyed then,
we could not realize today. For example, because of the multitude of commercial imaging satellites on the market, there is
no way General Schwarzkopfʼs maneuver to the west and north
around Kuwait would go undetected today. Our use of GPS
technology compelled Saddam Hussein to purchase several GPS
jamming devices prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (though,
fortunately, he and his military did not know how to employ
them very effectively). Also, because of our reliance on satellites
for communication, bandwidth was used to full capacity, sometimes forcing large ﬁles like imagery or Air Tasking Orders to be
shipped by airplane rather than satellite links. Further, Operation
DESERT STORM forced us to understand that our enemies do
not rely on technology like we do, and we were still ineffective
in shutting down all aspects of the Iraqiʼs ability to wage war.
Several analysts suspect that after our forces destroyed Saddam
Husseinʼs more advanced telecommunications systems (satellite,
microwave, and cable systems), he continued to relay launch orders to Scud missile batteries via courier.5
As the last century closed, the cost of launching satellites started to decrease and the number of civil and foreign entities getting
into the space business exploded. We had entered what many labeled “the Information Age.” But in this case, the availability of
information is a double-edged sword that is effectively whittling
away at the advantage enjoyed by the United States as one of the
historical few that has in the past controlled space system information.6 The commercial application and exploitation of space
information is another threat that must be a part of any military
space professional education.
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Organization and Education

We need space professionals in all services and agencies…to exploit
space effectively in the interests of national security. Development
of a space cadre is one of our top agenda items for national security
space programs in 2004.
- Under Secretary of the Air Force Peter Teets
Report to Congress, 12 March 2003

In 2001, Maj Daniel F. Gottrich was assigned to the USAF
Space Operations School (SOPSC), a division in the Space Warfare Center on Schriever AFB, Colorado. Its mission was twofold: to develop space tactics, techniques, and procedures for
warﬁghting doctrine and to educate space personnel (and members from other specialties who had signed up) about operational
space systems. A career space ofﬁcer who had just returned from
an overseas tour in Turkey, he was tasked to develop a lesson for
space doctrine, which he knew very little about, satellite communications, which he would have to brush up on, and something
called IO. Major Gottrich had never heard of the term, so he was
surprised to be assigned responsibility to teach a course on the
topic to a room full of joint professionals.
To prepare, Major Gottrich attended an IO conference in February of 2002 in Las Cruces, New Mexico called “Phoenix Challenge” which brought together military, industry, and academic
leaders to highlight the latest in IO technology, best practices, and
literature. The over-arching message was how prevalent IO was
in our society, and Major Gottrich was shocked that he had never
heard of it during his military training. Too often we as a military
equate IO with computers and consider it the bailiwick of communications experts. Indeed, Major Gottrich would often ask his
class members why they thought he was teaching IO in a space
operations class, and would inevitably receive the response: “because our satellites are controlled by computers.”
The past few years have seen new strides in education, sparked
by the creation of the Air Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell AFB,
Alabama in 1997 (compare this date with Armyʼs Training and
Doctrine Command established in 1968). New space and IO doctrine has been created and updated several times in those eight
years, and the lessons are trickling down to the units. “Air, space
and information functions work best in an integrated and synergistic way,” states a recent Doctrine Watch lecture emailed to
every Operations Support Squadron for further dissemination.
“Integrating effects-based information operations functions with
the other air and space power functions is a crucial part of the Air
Forceʼs operational art.”7
Doctrine became a very important part of SOPSC lectures,
particularly tying space and information operations together.
The course had already covered space doctrine, and the four core
space mission areas:
• Space Control – ensures freedom of action in space for the
US and its allies and may deny an adversary freedom of
action
• Space Force Support – consists of operations that deploy,
augment, sustain, and replenish space forces, including the
conﬁguration of command and control structures for space
operations and all launch operations
• Space Force Application – would consist of attacks against
terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapons
High Frontier

Adversary’s Uncertainty

1. Encryption

I donʼt know what they are doing.

2. Observation Management

Can I believe what I see?

3. Training

They seem to anticipate my moves.

4. Interoperability

What are the connections?

5. Data Fusion

Can I have a meaningful effect?

6. Launch on Demand

Should I expect more?

Table 1. Operational Art Element vs. Adversaryʼs Uncertainty.
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Robert D. Newberry

Operational Art Element

their effects on the enemyʼs ability to wage war.
We can also use space assets to defend our actions or counter
enemy propaganda. For instance, in 1998, Saddam Hussein decided to allow the United Nations weapons inspectors back into
his country, but informed them that they would not be able to
inspect “palace grounds.” We were able to use satellites as part of
a counter-information campaign to show the world how cooperative the Iraqi leader was really being.

Approximate boundary of Iraqi
declared Presidential Site

The approximate total area
of the White House and its
grounds.

DigitalGlobe - QuickBird

operating in or through space
• Space Force Enhancement – provides navigation, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
(ISR), ballistic missile warning, and environmental sensing
(weather)
The SOPSC lesson would demonstrate that the Space Force
Enhancement mission had the greatest impact on IO by providing the Information-In-Warfare (IIW) capabilities that enable the
commanders to have a full picture of the battlespace in order to
make the best decisions. It would also stress how space systems
would enable these elements, speciﬁcally the IIW capabilities,
through satellite support. ISR functions are supported by satellite
imaging capabilities, weather services rely on the Defense Meteorological Support Program satellites and the precision, navigation and positioning is provided by GPS.8
Furthermore, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2:
Space Operations, states: Space, air, and information platforms
are mutually supporting and supported throughout the spectrum
of conﬂict:
• Space assets are unable to contribute if their uplinks and
downlinks are interrupted or their ground control and receiving stations are disabled
• Information superiority helps ensure the freedom from attack for control and mission links that tie space providers to
ground, air, or sea-based users
• Space, air, and information superiority are mutually supporting objectives. It is extremely difﬁcult to maintain one
without the others and the value of one is greatly enhanced
when accompanied by the others9
Space and IO capabilities are intertwined and almost have a
symbiotic relationship. Information is the lifeblood of IO and
space plays a major role in providing the platforms for this info
to ﬂow. But space operations also enable some offensive and
defensive IO tactics as well. Space assets can be used for public
affairs, psychological operations, and operational security (OPSEC). Maj Robert Newberry wrote in Space Doctrine for the
Twenty-ﬁrst Century that OPSEC has been a prominent feature
of our space forces, and the trick is to balance usability with classiﬁcation issues. He writes, “A comprehensive OPSEC plan can
help prevent attacks on US space forces by making it more difﬁcult for an adversary to launch an attack.” Newberry also asserts, “OPSEC can create uncertainty as to the true nature of US
space operations and deny the adversary needed targeting data.
Although the beneﬁt to some space systems may be negligible,
OPSEC can be particularly effective in protecting high-value assets.”10 Major Newberry offers the following table comparing
different levels of OPSEC available within space operations and

Figure 3. Radwaniyah Presidential Site.

However, satellite technology is not perfect. During Operation ALLIED FORCE, the Serbs were still able to fool some of
our most skilled observers with rubber or wooden mock-ups of
cannons or aircraft. In one instance, they even hung lanterns in
the “exhaust” to make it appear on infra-red sensors to have a heat
signature.
About the same time as Major Gottrichʼs arrival to the SOPSC, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) was also reeling from a
scathing Congressional report released in January of 2001. The
Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization,11 also known as the
“Rumsfeld Report” since Donald Rumsfeld was the Chairman of
the Commission (before recusing himself to become Secretary
of Defense) had given the services a failing grade in developing
space professionals, in particular decrying the Air Force practice
of bringing in pilots to command space units for short periods in
a vain attempt to show breadth in leadership. Assignments were
poorly managed, and continuing education after entry level (as a
young airman or second lieutenant) was non-existent. The report
recommended that the Air Force be given one last shot to transform itself before being forced to carve off its space operations
into a separate service or a subordinate but separate entity like the
Navy/Marine Corps relationship.
Early in 2003, the SOPSC took the lead for developing and
executing the ﬁrst four-week “Space 200” course, geared towards
mid-career ofﬁcers, noncommissioned ofﬁcers, and civilians at the
8- to 10-year point. The course, using material taken from some
existing SOPSC courses and augmented with additional material
in the ﬁelds of acquisition, engineering, and nuclear operations,
had a stronger emphasis on warﬁghter integration of space power
in the joint ﬁght. The course also consisted of increased technical
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content, to include a design exercise in which student groups
designed a satellite program to fulﬁll a Department of Defense
(DoD) requirement, then considered its application in a capstone
wargame exercise at the end of the course.
SOPSC also initiated the development of Advanced Space
Training (AST) courses in order to produce system experts that
will return to unit or wing tactics shops to be instructors. Currently, space ofﬁcers are sent to the Weapons School at Nellis
AFB, Nevada where they become generalists in all space systems
and learn integration of air, space, and information operations.
These graduates are sent to Major Commands (MAJCOMs), Uniﬁed Commands, and theater Air and Space Operations Centers
(AOCs). The vision for AST is to mirror the air side of Weapons
School, wherein pilots are immersed in their particular weapons
system and graduate as experts on that platform. The SOPSCʼs
ﬁrst AST course, Navigation Operations, took ten ofﬁcers and
NCOs through an intensive, 12-week curriculum where they became experts in GPS, navigation tactics, the command and control structure, concepts of operation, acquisition, and weapon system applications.
In the spring of 2005, the Air Warfare Center and Space Warfare Center were administratively merged into the US Air Force
Warfare Center in order to “better manage air, space, and information operations combat capabilities to support missions worldwide.”12 There is talk of including the Information Warfare Center (another potential assignment for space operations personnel),
currently located at Lackland AFB, Texas, in future reorganization plans. In addition, more and more space professionals are
deploying overseas, and many of them are being attached to Information Warfare (IW) Flights within an AOC.
Organizationally, space command has been tied to IO since
the late 1990s. In response to a number of attacks on government computer networks, the Ofﬁce of the Secretary of Defense
ordered the Defense Information Systems Agency to establish the
Joint Task Force-Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND), which
was transferred to Colorado Springsʼ then Space Command
(USSPACECOM) in 1999. As the senior computer emergency
response team in the DoD, the JTF-CND was the responsible cell
for all CND issues, including recommending changes to the information condition status when the situation required.13 In 2001, it
was renamed the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations
to reﬂect its growth and mission, and continued to operate under
the IO portion of the USSPACECOM mission until 2003, when
US Northern Command was set up to coordinate military homeland security efforts and USSPACECOM was absorbed into US
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), with the IO tasking going
to USSTRATCOM at Offutt AFB in Omaha, Nebraska.14
Securing Information In Space

The [DoD] must enhance the capability and survivability of its space
systems. Activities conducted in space are critical to national security and the economic well-being of the nation. Both friends and
potential adversaries will become more dependent on space systems
for communications, situational awareness, positioning, navigation,
and timing. In addition to exploiting space for their own purposes,
future adversaries will likely also seek to deny US forces unimpeded
access to and the ability to operate through and from space. US
forces must ensure space control and thereby guarantee US freedom
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of action in space in time of conﬂict.15
- Director, Force Transformation Ofﬁce, 2003

Our dependence on space makes satellites not only a valuable
tool, but prime targets. Ideally, all satellites should be hardened
from attack; commercial investors, however, are reluctant to
spend the money to protect their satellites.16 High-altitude nuclear bursts and the resultant electromagnetic pulse (EMP) might
render most allied space assets inert. EMP could burn out the
circuitry of most allied radio systems, computers, transistors, and
power grids in the region of combat, rendering many of the alliesʼ
high-tech assets harmless.17
On the ﬂip side, because of cost and the physics involved, it
is unlikely that many countries are attempting to develop antisatellite weapons.18 It is more likely that an adversary will try
to exploit the information-gathering apparatus on the ground, either by physical destruction, jamming, or other means of denial.
Jamming is very similar to a computer hackerʼs denial-of-service
attack, essentially transmitting a high-power, bogus electronic
signal that causes the bit error rate in the satelliteʼs uplink or
downlink signals to increase, resulting in the satellite or ground
station receiver losing lock.19 GPS receivers, for example, are notoriously vulnerable to jamming because of the low power in the
navigation message. Power of just a few watts can jam the access
code at a distance of 10-20 kilometers.20 Indeed, the signal coming off a GPS satellite, orbiting at 12,500 miles, is the equivalent
of a 25 watt light bulb.
Attacking the link segment by spooﬁng involves taking over
the space system by appearing as an authorized user, such as establishing a command link with an enemy satellite and sending
anomalous commands to degrade its performance. Spooﬁng is
one of the most discrete and deniable non-lethal methods available for offensive counterspace operations.21 These ground attacks will appear like a series of nuisance events, or computer
vandalism. But how do we distinguish a computer “glitch” from
an information attack that has disrupted our satellite command
and control network, such as the May 1998 failure of PanAmSatʼs
Galaxy 4 communications satellite? The satelliteʼs computer
crashed unexpectedly, and the spacecraft temporarily went out of
control. Somewhere between 80 and 90 percent of Americaʼs 45
million pagers went dead, and National Public Radio lost its feed
to local stations.22
Offensively, information dominance can be attained “by collapsing an adversaryʼs command and control infrastructure
through offensive operations, such as the disruption of critical
communication links; or by denying access to reconnaissance and
surveillance information, such as blinding optical sensors with
ground-based lasers. Defensively, measures such as hardening,
frequency hopping, and encryption further ensure information
dominance by helping to ensure friendly forces have uninhibited
access to communications, surveillance and reconnaissance information provided by space systems.”23 It is these offensive and
defensive IO measures that the US needs to focus training and
funding toward in the coming decades in order to thwart the upand-coming challenges of a technologically savvy adversary such
as China.
The US military traditionally uses spacepower assets for two
primary purposes: (1) to improve the situation awareness of its
High Frontier

forces; and (2) as a means of command, control, and communications. Lieutenant Colonel Lee writes, “We essentially exploit
space power assets as a permanent informational infrastructure
that is globally available to friendly forces. This allows friendly forces to operate on interior lines of information around the
globe.”24 But it also allows our enemies access to this same information. Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam recently expressed
concern over Google Earthʼs free satellite imagery software,
which provides clear pictures of some of Indiaʼs military and
government facilities, claiming the information could be used by
terrorists to plan attacks.25
“No claim is made that US military forces are neutered without space support. Terrestrial forces can still ﬁght without space
support,” writes Maj M.V. Smith. “However, the absence of
space support will inarguably increase the fog, friction, and overall costs of military operations.”26
Recommendations for the Future

The Air Force must begin to think and bring forward the technologies necessary for space control. Capabilities to defend our own
space based resources and to disrupt, degrade, deny, or destroy that
of the enemy will be needed sooner or later in the 21st century. The
technologies needed to protect our space resources from enemies
include high thrust, high speciﬁc impulse electric propulsion, large
constellations of low cost satellites with distributed functionality or
networking across the system, and autonomous guidance and navigation.27
- USAF Scientiﬁc Advisory Board, 1995

Trying to predict our technological future is futile. In 1982,
the contemporary feeling from senior Defense Department leaders was that space-based lasers, capable of global ballistic missile
defense from ICBM launches from the Soviet Union, would be in
orbit in “ten or eleven years.”28 It is fair to conclude that we are
easily the worldʼs best military force, though our dominance may
not last forever, given the declining costs and spread of technology.29 But speculation on our speciﬁc offensive and defensive
capabilities is something for the scientiﬁc journals, though the
research labs, battle labs, and warfare centers are doing remarkable research.

The United States has ﬁelded laser illuminators that use semiconductor laser arrays to aid night vision devices. Projecting a laser
beam over a large area on the earthʼs surface would help low-light
imaging systems to ﬁnd targets. A space-based battleﬁeld illuminator would generate beams from satellites in low-earth orbit and direct them to the target. This technology would allow military forces
to acquire targets with low-light imaging systems, insert and remove
special operations teams under low light conditions, and increase the
security of high-value facilities at night. Because the beam is eyesafe, the illuminator could be used for psychological operations in
which US observers search covertly for enemy units.30

Fascinating reading, but it doesnʼt help us prepare the troops
for the type of combat we will start to see in the next thirty years,
in whatever form it appears. Author Jeffrey Barnett says it best,
“Information will dominate future war. Wars will be won by the
side that enjoys and can exploit:
- cheap information while making information expensive for
its opponent
- accurate information within its own organization while providing or inserting inaccurate data in its opponentʼs system
High Frontier

- near-real-time information while delaying its opponentʼs
information loop
- massive amounts of data while restricting data available to
its opponent; and
- pertinent information while ﬁltering out unnecessary
data.”31
It does not matter who has the most toys, Barnett implies.
“Tactical effectiveness … depends on the control systems over
the war theater and efﬁciency in utilizing information from the
theater.”32
Information operations is a skill that must be taught early and
properly managed throughout a career, just as AFSPC has tried
to turn around the management of space professional education.
To that end, it could use a senior-level champion, as proposed in
the Space Commission report, which stated that an Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence and Information should
be established to, among other things, “oversee the Departmentʼs
research and development, acquisition, launch and operation of
its space, intelligence and information assets.”33 Unfortunately,
in May of 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reported that
he had instead recommended that the staff “review the responsibilities and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence…” to this
end.34 This is the wrong focus; a cop-out. This again comfortably
equates information with technology and allows the management
of information operations to be swallowed up by a technocrat.
A second recommendation is to revamp information operations doctrine. As of December 2005, Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations, has not been updated in over seven years.35
(This is still better than the twelve years it took for JP 3-14, Space
Doctrine, to get published initially.) We believe that this is woefully inadequate. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, has been
updated twice since 2002. If the military is going to continue to
use doctrine as a repository for ofﬁcially sanctioned beliefs, warﬁghting principles, and terminology that describes and guides the
proper use of air and space forces in military operations, it must
remain current, ﬂuid, and substantive. It is appalling that Joint IO
doctrine has been allowed to languish for nearly a decade.36
Third, the concept of Information Control should be adopted
within IO doctrine. This would emphasize the importance of capabilities to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted ﬂow
of information while exploiting or denying an adversaryʼs ability
to do the same. In space doctrine, space control is the overall
realm of responsibility in which space superiority is gained and
maintained to assure friendly forces can use the space environment while denying its use to the enemy. To accomplish this,
space forces must survey space, protect the ability to use space,
prevent adversaries from exploiting US or allied space services,
and negate the ability of adversaries to exploit their space forces.
In the 21st century, air and space superiority is unfortunately almost immediately assumed before the ﬁrst shot is ﬁred. Implementing the overall situation awareness of the IO battlespace, and
comprehending the offensive and defensive requirements necessary to sustain an “information control” mission would help solidify information as the ﬁfth realm of warfare.
Finally, IO has become so important a concept in our military
that we should start to train IO specialists, that is, create a separate
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Air Force Specialty Code for information operations ofﬁcers and
enlisted troops, so that they can become IO experts. Currently, we
train experts in air operations and space operations, in weather, in
intelligence, in public affairs, in communications. We then assume
that each of them knows enough about information operations that
any one of them could ﬁll a slot requiring IO experience. Until
we begin to groom a cadre of IO professionals, and start to build a
twenty-year arsenal of individuals performing the IO mission day
in and day out, we will be forced to re-invent the wheel at every
level each time a new person rotates into an IO assignment.
Conclusion
There is nothing we do in space that is not information opera- Maj Gen Thomas Goslin, 2001
tions.36
In 2003, the Director of Force Transformation, Ofﬁce of the
Secretary of Defense, wrote that the DoD “will treat information
operations, intelligence, and space assets not simply as enablers
of current US forces but rather as core capabilities of future forces.”37 Therefore, information operations doctrine, training, and
career specialization must continue to evolve in the 21st century,
while simultaneiously strengthening its integration with space operations. As commander of the Space Warfare Center, Maj Gen
Goslin once said, “Today, more than anything, space provides information. And information today is a show-stopper.”38
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